The nature of "intelligence" and the principles of cognition / by C. Spearman.

  • Charles Spearman
Date:
1922
Catalogue details

Licence: In copyright

Credit: The nature of "intelligence" and the principles of cognition / by C. Spearman. Source: Wellcome Collection.

    362/376 page 350
    The question at issue, then, is no longer what it actually denotes, but rather what it shall be made to denote ; we are faced by the necessity of choosing between numerous alternatives. Most drastic of them would be to relegate the now so disfigured word to the limbo of mere popular usage. Another plan could be to attempt to restore to it something not unlike its ancient status as cognate to the mediaeval “ intellect ” ; with this aim, its scope might be restricted to a special case of our principle of educing relations, the case where the fundaments of the relation are highly abstract. On the whole, however, circumstances appear to be driving us towards yet another alternative, which consists in extending the range of the word so as to cover all three noegenetic principles in every one of their manifestations. Reference to Mental Tests. Especially pressing towards this decision is the great problem from which the present volume first set out, namely, as to the nature of that kind of “ intel- ligence ” which has been measured for literally millions of men, women, and children by means of mental tests. With regard to the manifold theoretical definitions that have been lavished upon this—the “ judgment,” the “ com- prehension, invention, direction, and censorship,” the “adaptability to new situations,” the “sensitiveness to significant combinations between experiences which illumi- nate one another,” and so forth endlessly—with regard to all these, little more need here be said. For the most part, they cannot be admitted to define genuinely any psycho- logical processes at all. And with the brilliant exception of Ebbinghaus, not one even of their own authors appears to have been able to make any actual use of them (p. 13). Turning to the tests that have really been employed, these seem to have always been unrestricted to any cognitive pro- cesses of any particular form. Certain forms are, indeed, growing more and more frequent ; but this fact has come about casually rather than by deliberate intention ; most often, the motive has only been to obtain a better agreement
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