History of intellectual development : on the lines of modern evolution / by John Beattie Crozier.

  • Crozier, John Beattie, 1849-1921.
Date:
1897-1901
Catalogue details

Licence: In copyright

Credit: History of intellectual development : on the lines of modern evolution / by John Beattie Crozier. Source: Wellcome Collection.

    41/596 (page 21)
    Cause implies a corresponding movement from a mental ante- cedent to a mental consequent. But in the Ancient Times with which alone we are here concerned, a Metaphysical or Philosophical Cause differed from a Scientific Cause in being the ' essence' or ^ spirit' of a thing rather than the thing itself, in iinderli/ing it, as it were, and havhig an existence independent of it. An illustration or two will perhaps bring out my meaning more clearly. Take, for example, the scent of a rose, and the effects of a glass of wine respectively as the phenomena requiring explanation. In Modern Times these would be attributed to the oil in the rose, and to the alcohol in the wine. In Ancient Times, on the contrary, they would be attributed to the ' essence' of the rose, and to the ' spirit' of the wine respectively ; and this is what I mean by a metaphysical cause. So, too, the physical, chemical, and other activities of the animal body would in Modern Times be regarded as the scientific causes of the movements and activities which the body displays ; in Ancient Times these movements would be referred to the * vital principle,' or ' animal spirits,' as their cause ; and this, again, is what I mean by a metaphysical cause. So too the exal- tation or depression of mind which to-day would be regarded as due to conditions of the stomach or liver, or of the brain and nervous system, would in Ancient Times have been referred to good or bad ' spirits' as their cause, while all those artistic^ poetic, and other intellectual productions which would now be assigned to a larger quantity or better quality of brain-matter as their scientific cause, would in Ancient Times be referred to * inspiration,' the ' divine afflatus,' and the like, as if, indeed, these were separate entities, having an existence apart from and independent of the activity of the brain itself. These are crude illustrations of what is to be understood as a Meta- physical or Philosophical Cause in Ancient Times; and if we are to see how the understanding of the nature of these causes is to help us to find the key to the evolution of Greek Philo- sophy it will be necessary, perhaps, to first figure to ourselves