The data of ethics / by Herbert Spencer.

  • Spencer, Herbert, 1820-1903.
Date:
1880
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: The data of ethics / by Herbert Spencer. Source: Wellcome Collection.

Provider: This material has been provided by the Francis A. Countway Library of Medicine, through the Medical Heritage Library. The original may be consulted at the Francis A. Countway Library of Medicine, Harvard Medical School.

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    § 2. Conduct is a whole; and^ in a sense^ it is an organic whole—an aggregate of inter-dependent actions performed by an organisDi. That division or aspect of conduct with which Ethics deals,, is a part of this organic whole—a part having its components inextricably bound up with the rest, xls currently conceived^ stirring the fire^ or reading a newspaper, or eating a meal, are acts with which Morality has no concern. Opening the window to air the room, putting on an overcoat when the weather is cold, are thought of as having no ethical significance. These, however, are all portions of conduct. The behaviour we call good and the behaviour we call bad, are included, along with the behaviour we call indifferent, under the conception of behaviour at large. The whole of which Ethics forms a part, is the whole constituted by the theory of conduct in general; and this whole must be understood before the part can be under- stood. Let us consider this proposition more closely. And fi^rst, how shall we define conduct ? It is not co- extensive with the aggregate of actions, though it is nearly so. Such actions as those of an epileptic in a fit, are not included in our conception of conduct: the conception excludes purposeless actions. And in recognizing this ex- clusion, we simultaneously recognize all that is included. The definition of conduct which emerges is either—acts adjusted to ends, or else—the adjustment of acts to ends; according as we contemplate the formed body of acts, or think of the form alone. And conduct in its full acceptation must be taken as comprehending all adjustments of acts to ends, from the simplest to the most complex, whatever their special natures and whether considered separately or in their totality. Conduct in general being thus distinguished from the somewhat larger whole constituted by actions in general, let us next ask what distinction is habitually made between the conduct on which ethical judgments are passed and the remainder of conduct. As already said, a large part of