A primer of psychology / by Laura Brackenbury.

  • Brackenbury, Laura.
Date:
1907
Catalogue details

Licence: In copyright

Credit: A primer of psychology / by Laura Brackenbury. Source: Wellcome Collection.

    78/140 (page 66)
    FEELING OB AFFECTION We have now to consider the third ultimate factor of consciousness—namely, Feeling, in the wide sense of tie term, or Affection. The student must he on his guard against confusing this technical use of the term reeling with any of the various meanings that the word has m ordinary usage. In Psychology we use it in the singular only ; there is but one ultimate factor of consciousness conditioned by the action of the object on the subject. It may be admitted that Feeling is not a good name tor this aspect of mind, hut objections similar to those that can be brought against it can also be raised against the other terms—Affection, Passivity, Passion whic ia'e been suggested, and these have not traditional authority behind them. They have, however the advantage of suggesting the idea of a state produced by the action of an object which the term Feeling does not; but the student will perceive that they are all alike open to objection on the score of ambiguity. _ _ It may be helpful to distinguish some 01 the meanings in which we do not use the term Feeling m this book We do not use it for the cognitive processes connected with the sense of Touch, for vague organic sensation or for pain-sensation—that is, we are not using it m the sense in which we say, This cloth feels rough or I feel in my pocket,” or “ I feel hungry, or I feel a pam. Hie term is used in these cases to denote fornis of co^tn e activity ; these are accompanied, as is all Cognition, by Feeling understood in the technical sense. Neither do we usethe word to denote an emotional state, m the sense of “ feeling1 ” angry or grateful. Ihe statements, I fee ang,'y!tra?efuVf etc., fefer to whole states of cm— nessjpsychoses, which we call Emotions, and with which 06