Psychology : an introductory manual for the use of students / by F. Ryland.

  • Ryland, Frederick, 1854-1902.
Date:
1900
Catalogue details

Licence: In copyright

Credit: Psychology : an introductory manual for the use of students / by F. Ryland. Source: Wellcome Collection.

    169/360 (page 153)
    coin is kept in a box. But it may be objected that the only way an idea can be in my mind is by my being conscious of it. The crude metaphor of box and coin is quite out of place. A state of consciousness, when I am no longer conscious of it, can only = 0. It no longer exists, as an idea; all that remains is the possi- bility of its revival, and this is not an idea. (2) Accordingly a modification of the hypothesis is proposed. It is suggested that the idea remains “ below the threshold of consciousness.” It has been from the first gradually fading away, losing its in- tensity, and lapsing further from the focus of attention. It can be brought back into full consciousness ; it still remains, in a sense, conscious, i.e., known with a minimum of consciousness. (3) Since, however, an unconscious idea, or a sub- conscious idea (for in this case the terms mean prac- tically the same thing), is inconceivable, some psycho- logists deny that presentations persist at all. What does persist is the physiological machinery which we suppose to serve as a basis for conscious processes. The brain and nerves remain, and they have acquired habits of action. Every psychical fact corresponds to a neural change; and this neural change tends to recur. A functional disposition, as Wundt calls it, is instituted. On this view retention is not a psychical fact at all; revivability is a psychical fact, but its condition is the physiological fact of retention. The recall of a pre- sentation has two aspects. “ The bodily side is the