A discussion on the organic materiality of the mind, the immateriality of the soul, and the non-identity of the two ... / by G.D. Dermott.

  • Dermott, G. D. (George Darby), 1802-1847
Date:
1830
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Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: A discussion on the organic materiality of the mind, the immateriality of the soul, and the non-identity of the two ... / by G.D. Dermott. Source: Wellcome Collection.

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    nues, the soul must remain dormant; and that, as soon as the life of the body ceases, the soul enters into a state of actual exist¬ ence. 19th. That material and spiritual things cannot be existing in a state of intimate connexion : inconsistent with 18. 20th. We do every thing from breeding and education. 21st. That conscience or judgmeut re¬ sults from education. Do the educated alone possess conscience then ? or is their conscience proportionate to their educa¬ tion? Do animals possess conscience in proportion to their breeding and education? 22d. That conscience is only the produc¬ tion of an accumulation of knowledge. 23d. That conscience is entirely the ef¬ fect of education. We repeat our former opinion, and maintain, that this paper is presumptuous, inasmuch as it professes an acquaintance with subjects not cognisable to man’s senses. That it is dogmatic, as assertions Nos. 11, 15, 16, &ic., will show. That it is in¬ consistent, may be seen by Nos. 4 and 21, &c. That it is ignorant of nature, will be seen by assertion No. 4, 5, and 18. We cannot but regret, that Mr. Dermott, while deeply engaged in apositive science, should put forth such theoretical notions ; that he should write papers absolutely useless, nay, worse than useless, injuri¬ ous ;—injurious not only to himself, but to the reader, who misapplies his time— the very material (?) of which his life is made. ON THE ORGANIC MATERIALITY OF THE MIND; &c. By G. D. Dermott, Esq. To the Editor of The Lancet. Sir,—1 feel myself bound to notice any thing you may be inclined to honour with a place in your very able Journal; and on that account, principally, I now come for¬ ward to meet two attacks, the one from a soi-disant clergyman, the other from a soi- disant phrenologist, upon my paper con¬ cerning the u Materiality of the Mind, and the Immateriality of the Soul.” As affairs of argument, it would be absurd to array myself against them ; both, espe¬ cially the writer who styles himself “ A Clergyman,” have so entirely misstated my case, that I can have no fair battle with them ; they both conjure up phantoms, which they call mine, and then set about to overthrow them. As somebody says, in the mock tragedy of Tom Thumb, they “ make the giants, and then conquer them.” My theory is briefly this :—First, that the mind is a material principle ; that is to say, that all the intellectual faculties are the organic functions of the cerebrum, in fact, the organic life of the brain (tak¬ ing it for granted that the principle of life is that which is so essentially and speci¬ fically combined with all organic matter, as to be the immediate cause of all action, or function, in organic matter). That the brain is an epitome of nervous impressions and actions—that the thoughts are actions of the brain—are excited by impressions made on its nervous susceptibility, i. e. that these actions of the mind are sequent to other material impressions and actions in the nerves, occasioned by external agents, positions which, I think, are finely illustrated by the continuity and homoge¬ neousness of structure and substance be¬ tween the brain and the nerves. Second¬ ly, that this same material mind is com¬ mon to all animals, being one and the same thing as the brain; but that the fa¬ culties of minds are stronger and better developed in a ratio to the size of the dif¬ ferent portions of the brain ; the vigour of its organic action, and the healthy con¬ dition of its structure.—Thirdly, that there is this difference between man and animals : another principle is attached to man’s existence, which is not attached to that of animals, it is not demonstrable, but attached to our being, in some way perfectly inexplicable—we call it the soul. That this soul, being entirely spiritual, is of a nature not to be understood by a ma¬ terial mind ; it is the spiritual part of man’s existence, referred for a state of de¬ velopment in a spiritual world : perhaps, if I may be allowed to use a comparison for the sake of explanation, to be the fu¬ ture spiritual mind of what has been me¬ taphorically called, in Scripture, a spiri¬ tual body. That it is rational to admit that this soul, in a future state, shall be responsible for the actions of the mind in the previous material existence, because it is the continuation of the same indivi¬ dual’s existence, only in a different state or form, the mind being the ostensible re¬ presentative of his existence in this world as the soul is in the next. Having thus endeavoured to define my own theory in my own wray, I return to my two assailants. The observations of the first, as I have before suggested, are any thing but argument; of course they can admit of no argument in reply. I shall, therefore, presently leave him, hopping and floundering in his marsh of contradic¬ tions, with his favourite “ toads and frogs,” the fit companions of a person who so ad¬ mirably unites the venom of the one with the ridiculous contortions and the dirty splashings of the other. Their society will perhaps, be a relief to him after “ smok¬ ing himself,” during the winter, witha sin
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