A discussion on the organic materiality of the mind, the immateriality of the soul, and the non-identity of the two ... / by G.D. Dermott.

  • Dermott, G. D. (George Darby), 1802-1847
Date:
1830
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Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: A discussion on the organic materiality of the mind, the immateriality of the soul, and the non-identity of the two ... / by G.D. Dermott. Source: Wellcome Collection.

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    throughout, that assertion supplies the place of proof) “ that the cortical part of the substance of the brain is only subser¬ vient to the medullary part, inasmuch as the former is the seat of birth, to certain qualities which afterwards become dif¬ fused or circulated through the medullary part of the brain, and even nervous system. ” As this conclusion is so highly interest¬ ing, we would gladly be informed how Mr. Dermott made the discovery of the birth¬ place of certain qualities which become diffused, &c.; where he found the propel¬ ling or circulating power, and how “ the medullary part of the brain” is proved to possess “ all the distinguishing living pro¬ perties peculiar to the brain, as living brain.” Now Mr. Dermott “ knows that there are certain masses, or portions of the brain, individually possessing their peculiar pro¬ perties,” which is the peculiar doctrine, I believe, of phrenology ; consequently, as these “ peculiar properties,” according to the first assertion, originate in the cortical part of the brain, they must be propelled or circulated through the medullary part of the brain and nervous system, of which we should like to examine some few of the author’s proofs. Mr. Dermott then asserts that “ one par¬ ticular portion of the brain is the region of perception, another of thonght, another of memory, and a fourth for judgment;” and we cannot but regret that none of these attributes of the fundamental faculties of the mind have been assigned a place ex¬ cept judgment, which we are told resides in the cerebellum! What, then, are the offices of the cerebrum ? These are fully established by Messrs. Flourens and Ro¬ lando, says our author ; for these gentle¬ men, he would make it appear, have taken aw7ay the cerebrum, and with it percep¬ tion, thought, and memory, but have left the judgment sitting undisturbed “ amid the wreck of matter ” in the cerebellum ! Now, that taking away an individual’s brains should deprive him of memory, &c., we can easily conceive, but to allow his cerebellum to remain, and with it his judg¬ ment, is very curious : reversing the order of things, however, w7e are led to suppose that the aforesaid gentlemen have removed the cerebellum and its illustrious inhabi¬ tant, and have left perception, thought, and memory, to revel, uncontrolled by judgment, in the apartments of the cere¬ brum ! Let experimentalists look to this; who knows but, in a short time, we may see some “ march of intellect ” man obtain a patent for purifying people's judgments, or, in other words, for an instrument to relieve them of all unnecessary incum¬ brance of thought, perception, memory, 6cc., by removing “ the seat of birth” of these troublesome faculties. But to be serious : Mr. Dermott says, “ It is in vain to state that what I have now ventured to affirm is untrue, upon the strength of an assumption founded upon ignorance and prejudice, and frequently made,—that the mental properties are totally different from the known properties, and all established ideas of matter ; for our ideas are founded upon our knowledge of dead or inorganic matter, to which, and theology, the divines, and every sensible man not in the profes¬ sion, should confine their speculations.” If divines and sensible men were to con¬ fine their speculations on mind to dead or inorganic matter, it is pretty obvious their speculations would soon be a dead letter. To return more particularly to our point —we have hitherto learnt from Mr. Ber- mott’s paper, that all the varied opera¬ tions of the mind are comprised in four functions, viz. perception, thought, me¬ mory, and judgment, yet not a single fact is proposed as a proof of this, unless the assertion could be taken for one, that Messrs. Flourens and Rolando have se¬ parated the cerebrum and cerebellum, and with these their several assigned functions. Let us now go to where Mr. Dermott takes up the “ argument on fresh grounds,” which are these, that nerves feel bv their peculiar properties, and that sensations and impressions are conveyed from the different parts of the body to the brain, and this (the brain) “ produces perception of sensation.” An assertion follow's, viz. that perception and sensation are material, being the actions of living matter; and further, that they must be material, be¬ cause material and spiritual things are in¬ compatible ! Thought is stated to be the immediate sequence of perception, and therefore not immaterial! “ The same may be said of memory and judgment, and. all other mental operations, the sequences of the last mentioned.” From these asser¬ tions, it would appear that all actions of matter must be maternal, and that actions of matter, and matter itself, are incompa¬ tibles ! To support Mr. Dermott’s doctrine, we are directed to look to comparative anato¬ my for “ incontrovertible facts.” This, we are told, teaches that the intellectual or higher part of the brain corresponds in size, so as to be commensurate in its de¬ velopment with the understanding, which wre are given to suppose, from the former assertions, is composed of memory, thought, and perception ; the judgment, let us bear in mind, resides in the cerebellum, and, consequently, far removed from the “higher part of the brain,” so that the understand¬ ing is not necessary to judgment. Now, were it correct that the intellectual or higher part of the brain corresponds in size to the understanding, a very useful table might easily be constructed, that would afford us, at one glance, the exact proportion of intellectual acumen possess¬ ed by any given individual. We are further informed, that the rea C
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