On the 'muscular sense' and on the psychology of thinking / by H. Charlton Bastian.

  • Bastian, H. Charlton.
Date:
1869
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: On the 'muscular sense' and on the psychology of thinking / by H. Charlton Bastian. Source: Wellcome Collection.

Provider: This material has been provided by The Royal College of Surgeons of England. The original may be consulted at The Royal College of Surgeons of England.

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    Jaccoud, therefore, thinks that the power which healthy persons enjoy of performing, with facility, movements that are at the same time habitual and complex depends, in the first place, upon the integrity of their ‘ muscular sense’, and in the second, upon that of their sense of touch. Impressions are derived through both these channels, whereby the brain becomes informed as to the amount and kind of movement which it has called into action ; and so it learns whether, to obtain the end in view, it should continue with the same volition, or should qualify it in any way. Jaccoud, in common with other physiologists, thinks that we are conscious of the impressions of the ‘ muscular sense’ and, as we have previously seen, that our power of appreciating dif- ferences in weight is dependent upon the exercise of this sense. I have already stated my reasons for rejecting this opinion, and have en- deavoured to show how, in reality, these estimations are inferences based upon previous sensory impressions of the passive kind—upon impressions emanating from the skin, from the joints, and from the muscles them- selves. In my opinion, there are no conscious impi-essions derivable through the ‘ muscular sense’. This, as I think, is not to be considered as an appanage of the intellect, but rather as an unconscious organic guide in the performance of voluntary movements. Why, it may be asked, do I not, as Trousseau has already done, deny its existence altogether? To this I should reply by saying,—although there is no evidence to lead us to believe that we derive any conscious im- pressions through the intervention of this so-called ‘ muscular sense’, there is evidence to shew that the brain is assisted in the execution of voluntary movements by guiding impressions of some kind, which whilst they differ in mode of origin from the impressions derivable by means of the ordinary cutaneous and deep sensibility, may differ still further from these, owing to the fact of their not being revealed in consciousness. How unless we grant something of this kind, are we to account for some of the phenomena of disease ? How can we account for the phenomena observed in such a case as that recorded by Dr. Bazire, and in many others of a similar kind, where all the modes of of the volition necessary to enable me to raise it. As a result of this education, I am enabled to initiate such a movement as I deem appropriate. But supposing in the case just cited, that the supposed simple bundle of wool was not a simple bundle, that it contained a heavy leaden weight in its centre, then my initial volition would have been inadequate, I should have been deceived, and the impressions that I then received from my sense of touch, from my muscles, and from my motor nerve-apparatus (con- cerning these latter I am now about to speak) would have instructed me that a stronger volitional effort was necessary; and it is in this way always that the sense of touch and the ‘muscular sense’ are supposed to intervene. By this supposed locomotive instinct, we know, as Jaccoud puts it, what force we ought to employ, whilst by ordinary sensibility and the ‘ muscular sense’ we are taught what force we have employed.