The nature of "intelligence" and the principles of cognition / by C. Spearman.

  • Spearman, C. (Charles), 1863-1945.
Date:
1922
Catalogue details

Licence: In copyright

Credit: The nature of "intelligence" and the principles of cognition / by C. Spearman. Source: Wellcome Collection.

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    no means always. In other words, the operations have that incomplete correspondence with one another that is expres- sible mathematically by correlational coefficients. Such correlations, however, it was now demonstrated, continue to exist when even the form of the operation is no longer the same but widely unlike. This continued tendency to success of the same person throughout all variations of both form and subject-matter—that is to say, throughout all conscious aspects of cognition whatever—appears only explicable by some factor lying deeper than the phenomena of consciousness. And thus there emerges the concept of a hypothetical general and purely quantitative factor under- lying all cognitive performances of any kind. Such a factor as this can scarcely be given the title of “ intelligence ” at all; being evoked to explain the correlations that exist between even the most diverse sorts of cognitive performance, it does not deserve a name appropriate to any one particular sort. On this view, accordingly, the name is commonly written in inverted commas, or else replaced by the simple letter g. Such a general and quantitative factor, it was said, might be conceived in an infinitude of different ways, including those which would assign to it the most subtle, abstract, or complex constitution. But a readily intelligible hypo- thesis was suggested to be derivable from physiology. The factor was taken, pending further information, to consist in something of the nature of an “ energy ” or “ power ” which serves in common the whole cortex (or possibly, even, the whole nervous system). But if, thus, the totality of cognitive operations is served by some general factor in common, then each different operation must necessarily be further served by some specific factor peculiar to it. For this factor also, a physio- logical substrate has been suggested, namely, the particular group of neurons specially serving the particular kind of operation. These neural groups would thus function as alternative “ engines ” into which the common supply of