The nature of "intelligence" and the principles of cognition / by C. Spearman.

  • Spearman, C. (Charles), 1863-1945.
Date:
1922
Catalogue details

Licence: In copyright

Credit: The nature of "intelligence" and the principles of cognition / by C. Spearman. Source: Wellcome Collection.

    14/376 (page 2)
    now in various stages of ripeness for publication. The problem of the said subjective analysis, in particular, forms the central topic of the following pages. In this first chapter, the point of view will be mainly historical and critical. A sketch will be given as to how the matter grew into importance, which were the chief difficulties that arose, what kind of attempts have been made at solving them, and why none of the so far proffered solutions can be considered satisfactory. “ INTELLIGENCE ” MEASURED BY TESTS Right up to the present day a large number—perhaps the majority—of even the best accredited textbooks on psychology do not so much as mention the word “ intelli- gence ” from cover to cover. Nor is any compensating employment made of synonymous expressions. The whole concept—although among the most familiar in ordinary life—would seem to have been in systematic psychological treatises deliberately ignored. Its acquirement of interest among psychologists may be traced, rather, to the sporadic writings that have come from experimental workers. For these have more and more occupied themselves with sub- mitting intelligence to measurements by means of mental tests. Such experimental activity is now assuming gigantic dimensions. Its sphere of application has included, as is well known, the whole American army. An example that may be cited of its rapid development in England also is my own still more recent testing of about 30,000 candidates for the Civil Service. And signs are not lacking that, before many years, the measuring will have been extended to the entire civilized population of the earth, and perhaps to much even of the uncivilized. Success of Ebbinghaus. In the course of such a tremend- ous movement, the question could not but arise with great urgency as to what, after all, is the real nature of this “in- telligence.” The first great attempt to grapple adequately