New pathways in science / by Sir Arthur Eddington.

  • Eddington, Arthur Stanley, Sir, 1882-1944.
Date:
1935
Catalogue details

Licence: In copyright

Credit: New pathways in science / by Sir Arthur Eddington. Source: Wellcome Collection.

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    between his perception of his surroundings and ours. But he is quite unable to convey to us how his perception differs. When he confuses red with green, does he see both colours as red or both as green or as some hue unknown to us? He has no means of telling us. The intrinsic nature of his per¬ ception is trapped in his mind. It cannot flow out along his nerves; nor could it travel up our nervous system if it reached It. Similarly the sensory quahties of colour, sound and scent cannot have been transmitted to us from the object in the external world to which we attribute the colour, sound and scent; for even if we suppose the object itself to be endowed with such qualities it would be as impotent as the colour¬ blind person to convey to us their character. The part played by the external object is to condition directly or indirectly the signals which pass along the nerves. The story which arises in our consciousness is a consequence of these signals, but it contains much that does not belong to the external message. The inference of any kind of knowledge of the physical objects which lie at the far end of these lines of communica¬ tion must evidently be very indirect. In this respect it differs from the knowledge constituted by the mind’s immediate awareness of its own sensations, thoughts, emotions. I have elsewhere expressed this in the words: “Let us not forget that mind is the first and most direct thing in our experience- aU else is remote inference”.* That is a statement which! I beheve, physicists accept almost as a truism, and philo¬ sophers generally condemn as a hoary fallacy. It is difficult to understand why there should be such a difference between us. I had thought that, hke many other differences, it might arise because we do not talk the same language; but some recent writings seem to show that the cleavage may be deeper, and that there is a tendency in modem philosophy to adopt a view which is scientifically untenable, f * Science and the Unseen World, p. 24. f See pp. 280-288.