Logic in practice / by L. Susan Stebbing.

  • Stebbing, L. Susan (Lizzie Susan), 1885-1943.
Date:
1934
Catalogue details

Licence: In copyright

Credit: Logic in practice / by L. Susan Stebbing. Source: Wellcome Collection.

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    of consciousness, or to confine problems to what are often called intellectual problems. There are no hard and fast distinctions in the development of mental life. The distinction between practical and theoretical problems does not relate to the kind of thinking involved, but to the set of purposes within which the problem originates, and hence to the kind of changes its solution is designed to bring about. A problem may be practical in the sense that it relates to bringing about a change in the environment, for example, making a box, or mending a clock, or disposing an army, or winning an election campaign. A problem may be theoretical in that it relates to bringing about a change in the mind of a thinker who has no other purpose in view than to apprehend a situation more clearly by discerning the connexion between its com- ponent elements. The purpose of solving the problem is, in the latter case, the acquirement of knowledge ; in the former, the doing of something. In both alike, thinking is directed to an end determined by the nature of the problem. In effective thinking con- sciousness of the conditions set by the problem directs the cognitive activity of the thinker, determining what shall come to mind. Directed thinking in its most highly developed form is reasoning. To be reasonable is to be capable of apprehending a situation as a whole, to take note of those items which are relevantly connected, and not to connect arbitrarily items not apprehended as signi- ficant. Apprehension of relevance depends upon two quite different factors : knowledge and sagacity. ‘ To be sagacious,’ William James has said, ‘ is to be a good observer.’ This statement may be accepted if we admit that a good observer is one capable of