The limitations of science / by J. W. N. Sullivan.

  • Sullivan, J. W. N. (John William Navin), 1886-1937.
Date:
[1938]
Catalogue details

Licence: In copyright

Credit: The limitations of science / by J. W. N. Sullivan. Source: Wellcome Collection.

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    oxygen. A scientific archangel, brooding from eternity on hydrogen and oxygen, taken separately, could not say that their combination would manifest the properties of water. In the same way, the property of life which is mani¬ fested by certain material aggregates could not be inferred from any amount of knowledge of the constituents of those aggregates. And the same applies to the still higher com¬ plexities which manifest mental properties. This theory is certainly not illogical, but it suffers from the disadvantage that it can never be proved. On the other hand, it could conceivably be disproved. As our knowledge of the hydrogen and oxygen atoms increases it may be that we shall be able to deduce that the properties of water must be exhibited by their combination. The theory of emergence will then be disproved. But our failure, however often we fail, does not prove the theory of emergence—it only makes it possible, perhaps, as time goes on, probable. Thus our attitude towards the theory of emergence depends, to some extent, upon our estimate of the present level of scientific knowledge. Has the science of physics a great deal yet to learn about the properties of matter? This is obviously a question that no man can answer, and scientific men, speaking officially, always say that science has barely begun. If this is true in the sense that the present principles and entities of physics are capable of indefinite application, then the theory of emergence must be regarded as, at best, a mere possibility, but not as a working hypothesis. The theory of emergence really assumes that our knowledge of physical and chemical entities is, in essentials, complete. Therefore our failure to deduce the properties of a living cell from the properties of its constituents is to be taken as in¬ dicative of an actual breach of continuity in nature. Thus a completely unified science is, in the nature of things, im¬ possible. We shall never reach a set of concepts in terms of which all phenomena can be described.