Elements of criticism / By Henry Home, Lord Kames.

  • Kames, Henry Home, Lord, 1696-1782.
Date:
1839
    passing sentence upon it: where it is conformable to principles, we can pronounce with certainty that it is correct; otherwise, that it is incorrect, and perhaps whimsical. Thus the fine arts, like morals, become a rational science ; and, like morals, may be cultivated to a high degree of refinement. Manifold are the advantages of criticism, when thus studied as a rational science. In the first place, a thorough acquaintance with the principles of the fine arts, redoubles the pleasure we derive from them. To the man who resigns himself to feeling, without interposing any judgment, poetry, music, painting, are mere pastime. In the prime of life, indeed, they are delightful, being supported by the force of novelty, and the heat of imagi- nation : but in time they lose their relish ; and are generally neglected in the maturity of life, which disposes to more serious and more important occupations. To those who deal in criticism as a regular science, governed by just principles, and giving scope to judgment as well as to fancy, the fine arts are a favourite en- tertainment ; and in old age maintain that relish which they pro- duce in the morning of life.* In the next place, a philosophic inquiry into the principles of the fine arts inures the reflecting mind to the most enticing sort of logic: the practice of reasoning upon subjects so agreeable tends to a habit; and a habit, strengthening the reasoning facul- ties, prepares the mind for entering into subjects more intricate and abstract. To have, in that respect, a just conception of the importance of criticism, we need but reflect upon the ordinary method of education ; which, after some years spent in acquiring languages, hurries us, without the least preparatory discipline, into the most profound philosophy. A more effectual method to alienate the tender mind from abstract science, is beyond the reach of invention; and accordingly, with respect to such specu- lations, our youth generally contract a sort of hobgoblin terror, seldom if ever subdued. Those who apply to the arts, are trained in a very different manner ; they are led, step by step, from the easier parts of the operation, to what are more difficult; and are not permitted to make a new motion, till they are perfected in those which %go before. Thus the science of criticism may be considered as a middle link, connecting the different parts of edu- cation into a regular chain. This science furnisheth an inviting opportunity to exercise the judgment; we delight to reason upon subjects that are equally pleasant and familiar; we proceed gra- dually from the simpler to the more involved cases; and, in a due course of discipline, custom, which improves all our faculties, * “ Though logic may subsist without rhetoric or poetry, yet so necessary to these last is a sound and correct logic, that without it they are no better than warbling trifles.”—Hermes, p. 6.
    bestows acuteness on that of reason, sufficient to unravel all the intricacies of philosophy. Nor ought it to be overlooked, that the reasonings employed on the fine arts are of the same kind with those which regulate our conduct. Mathematical and metaphysical reasonings have no tendency to improve our knowledge of man; nor are they applicable to the common affairs of life : but a just taste of the fine arts, derived from rational principles, furnishes elegant subjects for conversation, and prepares us for acting in the social state with dignity and propriety. The science of rational criticism tends to improve the heart no less than the understanding. It tends, in the first place, to mo- derate the selfish affections : by sweetening and harmonizing the temper, it is a strong antidote to the turbulence of passion, and violence of pursuit: it procures to a man so much mental enjoy- ment, that, in order to be occupied, he is not tempted to deliver up his youth to hunting, gaming, drinking :* nor his middle age to ambition; nor his old age to avarice. Pride and envy, two disgustful passions, find in the constitution no enemy more for- midable than a delicate and discerning taste : the man upon whom nature and culture have bestowed this blessing, delights in the virtuous dispositions and actions of others: he loves to cherish them, and to publish them to the world : faults and failings, it is true, are to him no less obvious; but these he avoids, or removes out of sight, because they give him pain. On the other hand, a man, void of taste, upon whom even striking beauties make but a faint impression, indulges pride or envy without control, and loves to brood over errors and blemishes. In a word, there are other passions, that, upon occasion, may disturb the peace of society more than those mentioned ; but not another passion is so unwearied an antagonist to the sweets of social intercourse : pride and envy put a man perpetually in opposition to others; and dispose him to relish bad more than good qualities, even in a companion. ITow different that disposition of mind, where every virtue in a companion or neighbour is, by refinement of taste, set in its strongest light; and defects or blemishes, natural to all,, are suppressed, or kept out of view ! I n the next place, delicacy of taste tends no less to invigorate the social affections, than to moderate those that are selfish. To be convinced of that tendency, we need only reflect, that delicacy of taste necessarily heightens our feeling of pain and pleasure; and of course our sympathy, which is the capital branch of every social passion. Sympathy invites a communication of joys and * If any youth of a splendid fortune and English education stumble perchance upon this book and this passage, he will pronounce the latter to be empty declama- tion. But if he can be prevailed upon to make the experiment, he will find, much to his satisfaction, every article well founded.
    INTRODUCTION. sorrows, hopes and fears: such exercise, soothing and satisfac- tory in itself, is necessarily productive of mutual good-will and affection. One other advantage of rational criticism is reserved to the last place, being of all the most important; which is, that it is a great support to morality. I insist on it with entire satisfaction, that no occupation attaches a man more to his duty, than that of cultivating a taste in the fine arts: a just relish of what is beautiful, proper, elegant, and ornamental, in writing or paint- ing, in architecture or gardening, is a fine preparation for the same just relish of these qualities in character and behaviour. To the man who has acquired a taste so acute and accomplished, every action wrong or improper must be highly disgustful: if, in any instance, the overbearing power of passion sway him from his duty, he returns to it with redoubled resolution never to be swayed a second time : he has now an additional motive to virtue, a conviction derived from experience, that happiness depends on regularity and order, and that disregard to justice or propriety never fails to be punished with shame and remorse.* Rude ages exhibit the triumph of authority over reason : phi- losophers anciently were divided into sects, being Epicureans, Platonists, Stoics, Pythagoreans, or Sceptics; the speculative relied no further on their own judgment but to choose a leader, whom they implieity followed. In later times, happily, reason hath obtained the ascendant: men now assert their native privi- lege of thinking for themselves ; and disdain to be ranked in any sect, whatever be the science. I am forced to exempt criticism, which, by what fatality I know not, continues to be no less sla- vish in its principles, nor less submissive to authority, than it was originally. Bossu, a celebrated French critic, gives many rules, but can discover no better foundation for any of them, than the practice merely of Homer and Virgil, supported by the authority of Aristotle: strange ! that in so long a work, he should never once have stumbled upon the question, whether, and how far, do these rules agree with human nature. It could not surely be his opinion, that these poets, however eminent for genius, were'entitled to give law to mankind ; and that nothing now remains but blind obedience to their arbitrary will: if in writing they followed no rule, why should they be imitated l If they studied nature, and were obsequious to rational principles, why should these be concealed from us ? * Genius is allied to a warm and inflammable constitution, delicacy of taste to calmness and sedateness. Hence it is common to find genius in one who is a prey to every passion ; but seldom delicacy of taste. Upon a man possessed of that blessing, the moral duties, no less than the fine arts, make a deep impression, and counterbalance every irregular desire : at the same time, a temper c&lm and sedate is not easily moved, even by a strong temptation.
    With respect to the present undertaking, it is not the authors intention to compose a regular treatise upon each of the fine arts; but only, in general, to exhibit their fundamental principles, drawn from human nature, the true source of criticism. The fine arts are intended to entertain us, by making pleasant impressions; and, by that circumstance, are distinguished from the useful arts; but, in order to make pleasant impressions, we ought, as above hinted, to know what objects are naturally agreeable, and what naturally disagreeable. That subject is here attempted, as far as necessary for unfolding the genuine principles of the fine arts ; and the author assumes no merit from his performance, but that of evincing, perhaps more distinctly than hitherto has been done, that these principles, as well as every just rule of criticism, are founded upon the sensitive part of our nature. What the author hath discovered or collected upon that subject, he chooses to impart in the gay and agreeable form of criticism; imagining that this form will be more relished, and perhaps be no less in- structive, than a regular and laboured disquisition. His plan is, to ascend gradually to principles, from facts and experiments ; instead of beginning with the former, handled abstractedly, and descending to the latter. But, though criticism is thus his only declared aim, he will not disown, that all along it has been his view, to explain the nature of man, considered as. a sensitive being capable of pleasure and pain ; and, though he flatters him- self with having made some progress in that important science, he is, however, too sensible of its extent and difficulty, to under- take it professedly, or to avow it as the chief purpose of the present work. To censure works, not men, is the just prerogative of criticism; and accordingly all personal censure is here avoided, unless where necessary to illustrate some general proposition. No praise is claimed on that account; because censuring with a view merely to find fault, cannot be entertaining to any person of humanity. Writers, one should imagine, ought, above all others, to be re- served on that article, when they lie so open to retaliation. The author of this treatise, far from being confident of meriting no censure, entertains not even the slightest hope of such perfection. Amusement was at first the sole aim of his inquiries : proceeding from one particular to another, the subject grew under his hand ; and he was far advanced before the thought struck him, that his private meditations might be publicly useful. In public, how- ever, he would not appear in a slovenly dress; and therefore he pretends not otherwise to apologise for his errors, than by ob- serving, that, in a new subject, no less nice than extensive, errors
    are in some measure unavoidable. Neither pretends he to justify his taste in every particular; that point must be extremely clear which admits not variety of opinion ; and in some matters susceptible of great refinement, time is perhaps the only infallible touchstone of taste : to that he appeals, and to that he cheer- fully submits. N.B. The Elements op Criticism, meaning the whole, is a title too assuming for this work. A number of these elements or principles are here unfolded: but, as the author is far from imagining that he has completed the list, a more humble title is proper, such as may express any number of parts less than the whole. This he thinks is signified by the title he has chosen, viz. Elements op Criticism,