Philosophy of mysterious agents, human and mundane, or, The dynamic laws and relations of man : embracing the natural philosophy of phenomena styled "spiritual manifestations" / by E.C. Rogers.

  • Rogers, E. C. (Edward Coit)
Date:
1853
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: Philosophy of mysterious agents, human and mundane, or, The dynamic laws and relations of man : embracing the natural philosophy of phenomena styled "spiritual manifestations" / by E.C. Rogers. Source: Wellcome Collection.

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    time attributed to the influence of celestial bodies; but all mod- ern geologists, with one consent, see it to be attributable to mun- dane agencies; that these shells had their origin at the bottom of the sea, and that a subsequent alteration of the relative level of the land and sea raised them to their present height above the latter.* 8. If, in a class of phenomena of an analogous character, we find one which is attributable to mundane agency, we are bound to refer them all to the same, and not to separate them, — attrib- uting that to the mundane agency which plainly indicates it, and the remainder to super-mundane powers, — as the principle of such a procedure would subvert the law of all scientific research. 9. It is no positive evidence against the supposed natural cause of a given class of phenomena that a few cases seem to be exceptions; much less are such apparent exceptions against the evidence of a plainly indicated cause; for in all classes of phe- nomena, where there are numerous conditions for their evolution, and counteracting or modifying causes existing, such apparent exceptions have always made their appearance, which are also made to disappear on allowing for their modifying causes. This remark becomes of the greatest importance, when (as is often the case, says Herschel) a single striking exception stands out, as it were, against an otherwise unanimous array of facts in favor of a certain cause. t 10. We are not to deny the existence of a cause in favor of which we have a unanimous agreement of strong analogies, though it may not be apparent how such a cause can produce the effect, or even though it may be difficult to conceive its existence under the circumstances of the case. t 11. The detection of a possible cause by the comparison of assembled cases must lead to one of two things: either, first, * See Herschel's Discourse, § 138. t Ibid., § 154 ; also, § 155, vrlnre an instance is given. t Ibid., § 148. 2*