Modern inorganic chemistry / by J.W. Mellor.

  • Mellor, Joseph William, 1869-1938.
Date:
1925
Catalogue details

Licence: In copyright

Credit: Modern inorganic chemistry / by J.W. Mellor. Source: Wellcome Collection.

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    refuse to go beyond fact, said T. H. Huxley, rarely get as far as fact. It is difficult to believe that so astute an investigator as Joseph Priestley really overlooked this mode of investigation, as might be supposed from some preceding remarks—nor did he. On the contrary, he said : It is by no means necessary to have just views, and a true hypothesis, a priori, in order to make real discoveries. Very lame and imperfect theories are sufficient to suggest useful experiments which serve to connect those theories, and give birth to others more perfect. These then occasion further experiments, which bring us still nearer to the truth, and in this method of approximation, we must be content to proceed, and we ought to think ourselves happy if, in this slow method, we make any real progress. The many gaps in our knowledge are temporarily bridged by the assumptions called hypotheses. Hypotheses thus help to render intel- ligible the interrelations between different facts, and they are employed by men of science to extend and deepen their experience by predicting and disclosing new facts ; to correct and purify their knowledge of natural phenomena by eliminating errors and contradictions ; and to systematize their description of facts so as to obtain the greatest control over them with the least possible effort. The verification of hypotheses.—An hypothesis may seem to be the logical consequence of known facts, or it may be a random flash of the imagination. However probable an hypothesis might appear, both the hypothesis and the logical consequences of the hypothesis must be tested by comparison with facts. Aristotle (c. 320 b.c.) certainly recog- nized the need for basing reasoning on observed facts, but, as G. H. Lewes has emphasized, Aristotle did not realize the very vital importance of verifying his logic by comparing its conclusions with facts, nor did he recognize that the true purpose of experiment is to verify the accuracy of data and of theoretical conclusions. We are indebted to Roger Bacon (c. 1280), perhaps more than to any other, for first insisting on verification as the essential pre-requisite for every trustworthy conclusion. He said : » Experimental science is the mistress of speculative science. She tests and verifies the conclusions of other sciences. ... In reasoning we commonly dis- tinguish a sophism from a demonstration by verifying the conclusion through experiment. Experiments have a way of giving results which differ from those which rigorous logic concluded must occur ; and when the prediction fails, it is necessary to find what has been overlooked. This does not mean that constant verification is needed to establish the validity of the process of reasoning, for that may be irreproachable and yet the conclusion may be false because the facts or premises upon which the reasoning was founded may have been interpreted to mean something very different from what actually obtains in nature, or because some unrecognized or undiscovered factor was involved. It is not wise to dogmatize when direct trial is possible : “ Do not think,” said J. Hunter ; “ try.” It has been aptly said that the remarkable discoveries of modern science have been made by invariably sifting the truth through a fine mesh of logical experiment. One of C. Darwin’s favourite methods of applying this method was to reason : “If my hypothesis be true, then certain consequences must also be true. Now let us find if they are true ” ;