Volume 3

Introduction to the literature of Europe, in the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries / by Henry Hallam.

  • Hallam, Henry, 1777-1859.
Date:
1855
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: Introduction to the literature of Europe, in the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries / by Henry Hallam. Source: Wellcome Collection.

Provider: This material has been provided by Royal College of Physicians, London. The original may be consulted at Royal College of Physicians, London.

    99/484 (page 83)
    Tims we imagine a triangle, but we can onl}r conceive a figure of a thousand sides; we know its existence, and can reason about its properties, but we have no image whatever in the mind, by which we can distinguish such a polygon from one of a smaller or greater number of sides. Hobbes in answer to this threw out a paradox which he has not, perhaps at least in so unlimited a manner, repeated, that by reason, that is, by the process of reasoning, we can infer nothing as to the nature of things, but only as to their names.p It is singular that a man conversant at least with the elements of geometry should have fallen into this error. For it does not appear that he meant to speak only of natural sub- stances, as to which his language might seem to be a bad expression of what was afterwards clearly shown by Locke. That the understanding can conceive and reason upon that which the imagination cannot deli- propre et veritable idde de Dieu ni d’un ange; ixiais j’ai souvent averti, et prin- cipalement en celui la rueme, que je prends le nom d'ide'e pour tout ce qui est C0D9U imme'diatemen t par l esprit; en sorte que, lorsque je veux et que je trains, parceque je con^ois en raeme temps, que je veux et que je crains, ce vouloir et cette crainte sont mis par moi en nombre des idees; et je me suis servi de ce mot, parcequ'il dtoit deja com- munement re^u par les philosophes pour signifier les formes des conceptions de l’entendement divin, encore que nous ne reconnoissions en Dieu aucune fantaisie ou imagination corporelle, et je n’en sa- vois point de plus propre. Et je pense avoir assez explique l’idee de Dieu pour ceux qui veulent concevoir les sens que je donne a mes paroles; mais pour ceux qui s'attachent a les entendre autrement que je ne iais, je ne le pourrais jamais assez. Vol. i. p. 404. This is in answer to Hobbes; the objections of Hobbes, and Descartes’ replies, turn very much on this primary difference between ideas as images, which alone our countryman could understand, and ideas as intellections, conceptions, voov^eva, incapable of being imagined, but not less certainly known and reasoned upon. The French is a translation, but made by Clerselier under the eye of Descartes, so that it may be quoted as an original. P Que dirons-nous maintenant si peut- etre le raisonnement n’est rien autre chose qu’un assemblage et un enchaine- ment de noms par ce mot est? D’ou il s’ensuivroit que par la raison nous ne concluons rien de tout touchant la nature des choses, mais seulement touchant leurs appellations, c’est a dire que par elle nous voyons simplement si nous assemblons bien ou mal les noms des choses, selon les conventions que nousavons faites h notre fantaisie touchant leurs significations. P. 476. Descartes merely answered:— L’asscmblage qui se fait dans le raisonne- ment n’est pas celui des noms, mais bien celui des choses, signifiees par les noms; et je m’etonne que le contraire puisse venir en l’esprit de personne. Descartes treated Hobbes, whom he did not esteem, with less attention than his other corre- spondents. Hobbes could not understand what have been called ideas of reflection, such as fear, and thought it was nothing more than the idea of the object feared. “ For what else is the fear of a lion,” he says, “ than the idea of this lion, and the effect which it produces in the heart, which leads us to run away? But this running is not a thought; so that nothing of thought exists in fear bnt the idea of the object.” Descartes only replied, “ It is self-evident that it is not the same thing to see a lion and fear him, that it is to see him only.” P. 483. G 2