Volume 2

A system of phrenology / by George Combe.

  • Combe, George, 1788-1858.
Date:
1853
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: A system of phrenology / by George Combe. Source: Wellcome Collection.

Provider: This material has been provided by King’s College London. The original may be consulted at King’s College London.

    11/540 (page 3)
    Other philosophers, again, have attributed to the external senses many acts which are performed by the internal facul- ties alone. For instance, Helvetius has said, that man owes his arts to the structure of his hands ; and that, if the hoof of the horse had been joined to the human arm, he would have been still wandering wild in the woods. But many animals have instruments equally curious, and perfect in structure with those to which peculiar capacities of mind have been attributed in man ; and yet these instruments do not produce in them the corresponding functions. Monkeys have hands almost as nicely formed as those which are at- tached to the human arm ; but do monkeys put wood upon the fire to support combustion ? or do they construct works of art ? According to this theory, also, insects, crawfish, lobsters, and still more the cuttle-fish, ought to have exact ideas of extension, of size, and of the theorems of geometry, in consequence of their numerous and perfect organs of touch. In point of fact, however, the external instruments are often similar, while the functions performed by them are quite diff'erent. The hare and rabbit have similar feet; yet the hare lies on the surface of the fields, while the rabbit burrows under ground. We have also examples of similar functions observed in animals which have instruments quite diff'erent. The proboscis is to the elephant what the hand is to man and to the monkey. The hands of monkeys and the feet of parrots and squirrels, are certainly diff'erent; yet, by means of these instruments, they all move their food to their mouths in eating. In order to dig up truffles, the hog ploughs the earth with his snout, and the dog scratches it with his feet. Some have taught, that the functions of the senses are not ordained by nature, but acquired by experience. Much, for example, has been written about the rectification of the sense of sight, by means of touch ; and about what they call the acquired perceptions of sight. Each sense, however, performs its functions in conse-