A table of the springs of action : shewing the several species of pleasures and pains, of which man's nature is susceptible: together with the several species of interests, desires, and motives, respectively corresponding to them: and the several sets of appellatives, neutral, eulogistic and dyslogistic, by which each species of motive is wont to be designated: to which are added explanatory notes and observations ... / By Jeremy Bentham, Esq.

  • Bentham, Jeremy, 1748-1832.
Date:
1817
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: A table of the springs of action : shewing the several species of pleasures and pains, of which man's nature is susceptible: together with the several species of interests, desires, and motives, respectively corresponding to them: and the several sets of appellatives, neutral, eulogistic and dyslogistic, by which each species of motive is wont to be designated: to which are added explanatory notes and observations ... / By Jeremy Bentham, Esq. Source: Wellcome Collection.

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    formed a certain act; then so it is, that among the psychological phenomena, which, on the occasion in question, have had place and operation in his mind, are the following, viz. I He has felt himself to have an interest in the possession o' that same good. 2. He has felta desire to possess it. 3 He has felt an aversion to Uie idea of his not possessing it. 4. He has felt the u-ant of it. 0. He has entertained a hope of possessing it. 0. He has had be- fore Ins eyes the fear of not possessing it. 7. And the desire he has felt ot possessing it has operated on his will in the character of a motive, by the sole operation, or by the help, of which, the act exercised by him, as above, has been produced. 10. 1 ucli has been the state ofihe case, of whatsoever nature the pleasure or the pain in question has been : whether of the self-re- gar ding or of the extra-regarding class : if of the exlra-regardinv class, whether of the social, or of the dissocial order or emus. 11. Thus it is, that these intimately connected, but not other- wise commensurable, appellatives serve for the exposition ol each ot lei : no one- of these having any superior genus, nor consequently being susceptible ot the only species of exposition as yet in com- mon use, viz. that which is called a definition, and is performed y the assignment of some word expressive of.a superior genus of which the word in question denotes a species. 12. 1 o the will it is that the idea of a pleasure or an exemption appnes itself in the first instance; in that stage its effect, if not conclusive, is velleity: by velleily, reference is made to the under- standing viz I. tor striking a balance between the value of this goo , and that of the pain or loss, if any, which present themselves as eventually about 10 stand associated with it; 2. then, it the ba- lance appear to he in its favour, for the choice cf means: thereupon, it action be the result, velleily is perfected into volition, of which the correspondent action is the immediate consequence. For the process that lias place, this description may serve alike in all cases : tune occupied by it may he of any length; from a minute fraction of a second as in ordinary cases, to any number of years. («) [eulogistic'] (0) [dyslogistic^ Ip) [neutral] 1. Eulogistic or dyslogistic, any such appellative may in either case be termed cen- sorial. 2. Thus it is that, in addition to the import which, in the cha- racter of a simple term, properly belongs to it, will be found in- volved in every such censorial appellation the import of at least one entire proposition : viz. a proposition expressive of a judge- ment of approbation or disapprobation, as above. 3. Various, and as yet seldom altogether determinate, are the grounds on which this judgement seems to have been framed 1. a supposed excess of intensity on the part of the desire ; (See Nos. 1,2, 4, 5, 11, 12, 13. 14.) 2. a supposed impropriety in the choice ol the subject, on which the act, from which the pleasure is expected lo be derived, is exercised: (See No. 2.) 3. a supposed