Instinct and intelligence / by Charles S. Myers. Instinct and intelligence : a reply / by Charles S. Myers.

  • Myers, Charles S. (Charles Samuel), 1873-1946.
Date:
[1910?]
Catalogue details

Licence: In copyright

Credit: Instinct and intelligence / by Charles S. Myers. Instinct and intelligence : a reply / by Charles S. Myers. Source: Wellcome Collection.

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    it is certain that, on the occasion of the chick’s first peck or the duckling’s first swim, the bird is dimly, of course very dimly, conscious of the way in which it is about to act. I believe this, because no organism can ever execute a new movement which does not involve other movements that have been performed previously. A completely new movement is as impossible as a completely new thought. When a chick first attempts to peck, many of the muscles then called into action must have been contracted before. Thus the feeling of activity arising on the occasion of a chick’s first peck is not altogether a new one. It is related, as each of our own experiences is related, to past experiences. And the very vague awareness of results which is asso¬ ciated with those previous feelings of activity gives the chick a vague awareness of the result of its first peck, before it has actually performed the action. Such awareness is, of course, rudimentary in the extreme. The chick or duckling cannot then—or indeed ever—be aware of the aims of its instincts, as we are aware of them. But it is important to note what rudimentary consciousness of this kind exists, and to realize that it is the embryonic representative of meaning. The question arises—are instincts of all kinds and in all circum¬ stances characterized by these rudiments of conation and meaning ? I think that they are absent under two conditions only, first, if the instinct has been repeated sufficiently often; secondly, if the instinct is from the first unalterable by later experience. But I would suggest that the same word instinct cannot be suitably employed to embrace, in addition, either of these conditions. For from the standpoint of individual experience, the first few times of performance of an instinct must be very different from the thousandth time of performance ; the instinct has become a “ habit.” And an instinct which is from the first unalterable is, as I shall immediately urge, nothing but a reflex. Having attempted to show that the subjective aspects of so-called instinctive and intelligent behaviour differ in degree and not in kind, I turn now to consider the alleged difference in their objective aspects, —the fixity of instinct, the plasticity of intelligence. An instinct has been defined as “ a complicated reaction that is perfect the very first time1.” I question whether this is ever literally the case, if only the reaction could be submitted to close enough examination. Young birds usually learn to fly and to sing by imitating their elders. Even the young of ants, where “ instinct ” is considered 1 H. Driescb, The Science and Philosophy of the Organism. Gifford Lectures (Aberdeen),. 1908, pOllO. 14--2