Color images in the brain : being an account of the detection of visible objects, seen posited on exchanged sides in the brain, after the intromission of impressions of light, reflected from external objects, one in each eye ... / by John Fearn.

  • Fearn, John, 1768-1837.
Date:
[1831]
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: Color images in the brain : being an account of the detection of visible objects, seen posited on exchanged sides in the brain, after the intromission of impressions of light, reflected from external objects, one in each eye ... / by John Fearn. Source: Wellcome Collection.

Provider: This material has been provided by The Royal College of Surgeons of England. The original may be consulted at The Royal College of Surgeons of England.

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    dation of all atheism,—a belief which, its advocates own, has no other than a natural prejudice of untavcjht man for its voucher—namely—that prejudice by which, when a clown strikes his foot against a stone, he confidently believes he touches solid hody; while all natural philo- sophers now hioiv, and are agreed, that he is deceived, and touches nothing hut something immaterial. At the same time, the Philosophy of Scotland,, in point of sublimity, is as far beneath that which explodes matter, as a soap bubble is beneath that of the Orb whose rays render that bubble visible. From what I have now said, the Philosophy of Scotland never has resisted, and never will in the least degree resist, the torrent of atheistical opinion, in any country. And it is here, on the testimony of Professor Stewart himself, that it cannot, in the least degree stop that inundation of persiflage, which cer- tainly, though silently, saps, and rots to the foundatiouj the very pretence to moral rectitude ; which pretence it proscribes as being certain hypocrisy in the pretender: For, such is persiflage. But, the existing case, which NOW calls for examination, is this : The Scotch Philosophy,—thus impotent, and many times refuted, though refuted without its being listened to, is that same which ridiculed the Philosophy of Newton— ridiculed it upon the vital assumption—vital to the subject in question—that Color Images could not exist in the brain. And, I here repeat,—(and I could not repeat it too often for the sake of what impends,)—iVophilosopher will, ever more, ridicule Newton for his belief in Color Images! May it not, then, be expected that thinking men will, NOW, examine farther into the merits of Newton's Creed,—a creed which is identical with that of Locke ; and, on the investigation of the problem which involves it, I may firmly believe, I have labored longer, and with more in- tensity, than any man now living, or perhaps than any man that ever lived; but which creed has, with a violation of truth altogether astonishing, been misstated as being the