On medico-psychological evidence and the plea of insanity in courts of law : being portion of an introductory lecture to a course on mental diseases, with clinical instruction, delivered in connection with the Royal Infirmary School of Medicine / by Alexander Robertson.

  • Robertson, Alexander.
Date:
[1877]
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: On medico-psychological evidence and the plea of insanity in courts of law : being portion of an introductory lecture to a course on mental diseases, with clinical instruction, delivered in connection with the Royal Infirmary School of Medicine / by Alexander Robertson. Source: Wellcome Collection.

Provider: This material has been provided by The Royal College of Surgeons of England. The original may be consulted at The Royal College of Surgeons of England.

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    There is here a distinct admission that the criteria of responsibility by which the bench “ at one time ” instructed juries was erroneous, and it is certainly satisfactory to find this so frankly stated. We fear, however, that the tests proposed by his lordship in place of the discarded ones will be found insufficient in some of the most important cases that come before courts of justice. Thus, in M‘Naughtan’s case already referred to, it was proved, as I have said, that he had transacted business shortly before committing the criminal act. Business capacity, therefore, fails here as a test, though the supplementary criterion delusion is appli- cable. But take the following case which was under my care a number of years since :—An affectionate mother, re- duced by nursing but still able to attend to her domestic duties, was dismayed to find that a strong temptation to kill her infant, whom she tenderly loved, had arisen in her mind, and fearing that she might give way to the terrible prompting, she consented to enter the asylum. There was a degree of melancholia present, but no delusion was ap- parent. Her general health rapidly improved, and after a few weeks’ residence she returned to her family, the homi- cidal disposition having passed away. If the impulse had overcome her feeble powers of resistance and she had killed her child, neither of the tests referred to would have saved her from suffering the extreme penalty of the law, as until her entrance into the asylum she had been engaged as usual in household work and never manifested any delusion. At the same time, had she been hanged, there would certainly have been another instance of “ unreasoning inhumanity.” I might quote many moi’e equally striking examples of the homicidal impulse from medico-legal works, but time will not permit, and besides I prefer drawing on my own experi- ence for illustrations. A patient now under my care has frequently an almost overpowering tendency to destroy any- thing near her—it matters not what; not to kill, fortunately; though occasionally it is to commit suicide. She once said to me, “ I feel that if it were possible I could tear the whole building down;” and repeatedly, when busy at her work,