Copy 1

A view of the philosophical principles of phrenology / [J.G. Spurzheim].

  • Spurzheim, J. G. (Johann Gaspar), 1776-1832.
Date:
[1825?]
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: A view of the philosophical principles of phrenology / [J.G. Spurzheim]. Source: Wellcome Collection.

    16/236 (page 2)
    In the study of the human body, general and common notions are also distinguished and separated from those which are particular; the body is divided into several systems, such as the muscular, osseous, nervous, glandular, &c.; determinate functions, too, are specified, as the secretion of saliva, of bile, tears, &c. But this distinction between general, common, and special notions is entirely neglected in the study of the mind, and even in that of the functions which in animals take place with consciousness. Zoologists divide and subdivide the organization of the beings they study, and determine the structure of each par- ticularly, but they consider their animal life, in a manner, quite general. Whatever is done with consciousness is ex- plained by means of the word imstinct. Animals eat and - drink, and construct habitations by instinct; the nightingale sings, the swallow migrates, the field-mouse makes provisions for the winter, the chamois places sentinels, sheep live in society, &c., and all by instinct. This is certainly a very easy manner of explaining facts; instinct is the talisman which produces every variety in the actions of animals. The know- ledge conveyed, however, is general, and therefore completely vague. What is instinct? Is it a personified being, an entity, a principle? or does the word, according to its Latin etymo- logy, signify only an internal impulse to act in a certain way in ignorance of the cause? I take it in the latter signification ; thus the word ¢nstinet denotes every inclination to act arising from. within. Instincts, moreover, are merely effects, and do not express - peculiar causes producing determinate inclinations. In stating