A treatise on the law of idiocy and lunacy / by A. Highmore.

  • Highmore, A. (Anthony), Jr., 1758-1829.
Date:
1822
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: A treatise on the law of idiocy and lunacy / by A. Highmore. Source: Wellcome Collection.

Provider: This material has been provided by the National Library of Medicine (U.S.), through the Medical Heritage Library. The original may be consulted at the National Library of Medicine (U.S.)

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    in whom it appears is in a state of sanity ; the action is only a rapid and momentary effect, the interval continues and supports itself; the action only marks a single fact, the interval is a state composed of a succession of actions. And to have a sensible proof of this, let us examine the case of those, who are only affected upon one or two principal points: one person is always seeing precipices, another supposes the people want to stop him; one trans- forms himself into a beast, another by a folly still more out- rageous, believes himself to be God. If you do not intro- duce these subjects, they appear reasonable as to every thing else ; put them upon these points, they immediately discover their weakness. The madman who believed that all the merchandize which came into the port of Pj/rettm, was consigned to him, could still judge very rea sonably of the state of the sea, of storms, of signs, from which he might hope the safe arrival of vessels, or appre hend their loss. The person of whom Horace has given so ingenious a picture, who always thought he was attend- ing at a shew, and wrho, followed by a troop of imaginary comedians, became a theatre to himself, in which he was at the same time both the actor and the spectator, ob- served in other respects all the duties of social life : Caetera qui vita; servaret munia recto More, bonus sane vicinus, amabilis hospes, &c. Yet who could suppose that such persons were in a condition to make a testament ? ** If it was true that a proof of some sensible actions was sufficient to induce a presumption of lucid intervals, it must be concluded, those who allege insanity could never gain their cause, and that those who maintained the contrary could never lose it. For a cause must be very badly off, in which they could not get some witnesses to speak of sen- ble actions. Now, if from thence alone you were to draw