Problems of science and philosophy : the papers read at the joint session of the Aristotelian Society, the British Psychological Society, and the Mind Association, held at Bedford college, London, July 11th-14th, 1919.

Date:
1919
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: Problems of science and philosophy : the papers read at the joint session of the Aristotelian Society, the British Psychological Society, and the Mind Association, held at Bedford college, London, July 11th-14th, 1919. Source: Wellcome Collection.

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    frame of mind while we make the assertions, but to those features in the constitution of the world which make our assertions true (if they are true) or false (if they are false). To say that facts are complex is the same thing as to say that they have constituents. That Socrates was Greek, that he married Xantippe, that he died of drinking the hemlock, are facts that all have something in common, namely, that they are “about” Socrates, who is accordingly said to be a con- stituent of each of them. Every constituent of a fact has a position (or several positions) in the fact. For example, “Socrates loves Plato” and “Plato loves Socrates” have the same constituents, but are different facts, because the constituents do not have the same positions in the two facts. “Socrates loves Socrates ” (if it is a fact) contains Socrates in two positions. “Two and two are four” contains ¢wo in two positions. “242 = 2?” contains 2 in four positions. Two facts are said to have the same “form” when they differ only as regards their constituents. In this case, we may suppose the one to result from the other by swbstituteon of different constituents. For example, “Napoleon hates Wellington” results from “Socrates loves Plato” by sub- stituting Napoleon for Socrates, Wellington for Plato, and hates for loves. It is obvious that some, but not all, facts can be thus derived from “Socrates loves Plato.” Thus some facts have the same form as this, and some have not. We can represent the form of a fact by the use of variables: thus “Ry” may be used to represent the form of the fact that Socrates loves Plato. But the use of such expressions, as well as of ordinary language, is lable to lead to mistakes unless care is taken to avoid them. There are an infinite number of forms of facts. It will conduce to simplicity to confine ourselves, for the moment, to facts having only three constituents, namely, two terms and a dual (or dyadic) relation. In a fact which hae three con-